Brigham Young University

BYU ScholarsArchive
Theses and Dissertations
2017-07-01

Differences in German Youth Gender Ideologies: The Relationship
Between Family Structure and Doing Gender
Alyssa Jane Alexander
Brigham Young University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd
Part of the Sociology Commons

BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Alexander, Alyssa Jane, "Differences in German Youth Gender Ideologies: The Relationship Between
Family Structure and Doing Gender" (2017). Theses and Dissertations. 6541.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/6541

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please
contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Differences in German Youth Gender Ideologies: The Relationship Between
Family Structure and Doing Gender

Alyssa Jane Alexander

A thesis submitted to the faculty of
Brigham Young University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science
Mikaela J. Dufur, Chair
Jonathan A. Jarvis
Michael R. Cope

Department of Sociology
Brigham Young University

Copyright © 2017 Alyssa Jane Alexander
All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT
Differences in German Youth Gender Ideologies: The Relationship Between
Family Structure and Doing Gender
Alyssa Jane Alexander
Department of Sociology, BYU
Master of Science
Gender ideologies, which are constantly changing, are important for many outcomes in life, but
the majority of gender ideology research focuses mainly on adults. Past research studying adult
gender ideologies finds that adults’ current relationship status affects their ideologies. For
instance, divorced adults hold egalitarian ideologies more than stable married adults do (Davis,
Greenstein and Marks 2007). Researchers attribute this finding to the types of gender behaviors
adults perform with their partner or alone. What about youth? Understanding how these
ideologies develop earlier in life is important, yet research rarely focuses on youth gender
ideologies or their development. My research looks at the effects of family structure on youth
gender ideology in Germany (Germany National Educational Panel Study (NEPS); Cohort One
N=4,181; Cohort Two N=9,913). I argue it is through doing gender that family structures operate
to influence the development of youth gender ideology, since parents’ doing gender behaviors
performed with their children vary by family structure. My findings suggest family structure
does not matter for doing gender behaviors that parents perform with their children, thereby
affecting their gender ideologies. As a result, it is more about other ways adults do gender
outside of the home or about the youth themselves. I also find significant effects for females,
suggesting females may invest more in the outcomes egalitarian gender ideologies produce.
Future research should look at shifts in family structure and duration in various family structures
in order to understand family structure’s impact on gender ideology for youth.
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Differences in German Youth Gender Ideologies: The Relationship Between
Family Structure and Doing Gender
In recent years, there has been rapid change in family formation and romantic partnering
(Mather 2010). Furthermore, this rapid change has been associated with shifting gender
ideologies among adults (Mason and Lu 1988). This shift in gender ideologies can vary in
intensity and direction, and can have a significant impact on societal and individual level
outcomes (John, Shelton, and Luschen 1995; Christie-Mizell et al. 2007). Much of past literature
focuses on how family structure affects how adults do gender with their partners, not how they
do gender with their children. Even with shifts in gender ideologies and family formation among
adults, little research has studied how these changes in doing gender behaviors may affect
youths’ gender ideologies. This is especially important because youth may be more vulnerable to
these shifts since they spend more time with their parents than older individuals (Kiecolt and
Acock 1988).
With my research, I aim to uncover whether family structure influences youth gender
ideologies. Family structure can affect how parents model behaviors and attitudes at home, in
turn influencing their offspring’s gender ideology. In order to look at youth gender ideology
differences, I analyze German youth across an array of family structures and ages. I predict
youth in single-parent families will have the most egalitarian gender ideologies, and youth with
stepparents or social parents will be more egalitarian than those youth with two-parent biological
married parents. Furthermore, I predict that girls will be more sensitive to the potential effects of
family structure on gender ideology than boys will, and will be more egalitarian. Overall, I find
that youth with stepparents are more egalitarian, but my biggest finding suggests support for the
final hypothesis – that girls are more egalitarian than boys are.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Gender Ideologies
From the women’s social movements to the battle for same sex rights, gender, and gender
ideologies, permeate all aspects of life. Gender ideology refers to the, “system of values, beliefs,
and attitudes a person holds about the meaning of biological sex and gender” (Halpern and
Jenkins 2016:1). Furthermore, gender ideologies often include attitudes about how individuals
believe men and women should act in society. For example, if an individual believes that women
should stay at home and only have children, this reflects their traditional gender ideologies.
Egalitarian ideologies reflect equality between the sexes, in that people believe that men and
women should be allowed to do the same things in society, hold the same jobs, act in similar
ways, and not be treated badly because of it. The majority of research studying gender ideology
looks at beliefs about women working, such as whether people believe women should work
outside the home (Ciabattari 2001). In recent years, scholars have begun including gender
ideology measures that look at other areas that primarily affect women, such as child care,
fertility, relationship quality, and abuse. (Davis and Greenstein 2009). This research has
primarily focused on married women. These measures of gender ideology are important to look
at because they can influence societal policies including women’s work, women’s education, and
child care, as well as individual-level decisions about fertility and relationship quality.
Gender Ideologies’ Influence on Society
Gender ideologies can affect how a society views women in both beneficial and
detrimental ways. For example, a society that holds more traditional gender ideologies may be
more accepting of particular forms of discrimination, like sexism (Brandt 2011). Gender
ideologies vary based on the country of study (Lavee and Katz 2002; Kaufman and Bernhardt
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2012; Kim and Choi 2012). These potential differences influence the opportunities women have
in their society, with some countries placing more importance on egalitarian ideologies while
others place more importance on traditional ideologies (Alesina et al. 2013; Twenge 1997). For
instance, in some countries women lead governments, while in others women are discouraged
from driving a car. Gender ideologies also help drive cross-national differences in percentages of
women in the workforce or in higher education (John, Shelton, and Luschen 1995; Kaufman and
Bernhardt 2012). One example of this takes place in Rwanda, where after their mass genocide,
policy makers implemented egalitarian laws that required a higher number of women in
parliament (Kristoff and WuDunn 2010). This implementation of egalitarian gender laws
actually helped to make their country grow and prosper (Kristoff and WuDunn 2010).
Most past research on gender ideologies focuses on the United States, or other Western
countries like the United Kingdom and Sweden. However, since women’s opportunities may
vary depending on the country of residence, it is important to understand the impact of gender
ideologies in other countries. There may be cultural or class differences within countries that are
different from the United States. In addition, since gender ideologies can have an impact on the
societal level, it is also important to look at the other impacts they can have.
Gender Ideologies’ Influence on Individuals
In addition to the impact that gender ideologies have on broader societies, they can also
have an impact at the individual level. For example, individual women’s feelings about gender
affect their choices concerning educational attainment, work force participation, and health.
Holding egalitarian views not only increases opportunities for women, but also benefits the
holders of these views, both male and female, resulting in more positive life outcomes. For
instance, individuals who hold more egalitarian views expected to gain more education (Davis
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and Pearce 2007), had higher self-esteem (Weiss, Freund, and Wiese 2012), and were more
supportive of their partners in their personal goals (Tichenor 2005; Braun et al. 2008; Boudet et
al. 2013).
On the other end of the spectrum, individuals with more traditional gender ideologies
tended to be more negative towards others, and, among women, are less likely to seek
opportunities to advance their position in both the home and the workplace. For instance,
scholars have found that men who hold traditional gender ideologies are more likely to be
discriminatory or violent towards others (Totten 2003; Magallares 2016). Women with more
traditional gender ideologies tend to have lower earnings at work (Christie-Mizell et al. 2007),
suggesting they may not seek advancement. Since gender ideologies help shape opportunities for
later in life, it is important to understand why people hold the beliefs they do, and how they
develop these beliefs. Family formation, or romantic partnering, plays an important part in what
gender ideologies an individual holds.
The Impact of Family Structure: A Doing Gender Perspective
When looking at why adults hold particular ideologies, scholars have found that adults’
partnering is associated with their gender ideologies (Morgan and Walker 1983; Batalova and
Cohen 2002; Barber et al. 1989). These scholars believe this may have to do with the way adults
do gender with their partners. Doing gender is, “a complex of socially guided perceptual,
interactional, and micropolitical activities that cast particular pursuits as expressions of
masculine and feminine ‘natures’” (West and Zimmerman 1987:126). In other words, the doing
gender perspective suggest that individuals construct their gender through their behaviors in
everyday situations by performing roles fitting of their sex. The majority of past research that has
looked at how doing gender in the home impacts adult gender ideologies focuses mainly on the
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division of labor between partners since the division of labor is often a measure of doing gender
between partners (Davis, Greenstein, and Marks 2007). This measure often looks at how partners
do gender together, such as with women doing housework or caring for a child, traditionally
feminine tasks, while men work outside the home (West and Zimmerman 1987; Deutsch 2007).
There may be something biological about the types of doing gender behaviors an individual
does, but for the most part, this doing gender process is largely a social construct (Goffman
1977). What goes on in the home, specifically the division of labor, impacts gender ideologies,
and doing gender can vary based on the family structure an individual resides in.
Adult gender ideologies: family structure and doing gender. Looking even further at why
family structure may affect adult gender ideologies, scholars have turned to doing gender and
found that doing gender behaviors vary depending on the family structure an adult resides in,
which then affects their gender ideologies. With marriage, divorce, and remarriage come norms
about doing gender behavior. There are differences in gender ideologies across stable coupled
adults, uncoupled adults, and re-coupled adults (Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Vespa 2009), likely
attributable to the distribution of doing gender behaviors, such as the division of labor, that
adults perform with their partners (Davis, Greenstein, and Marks 2007). Traditionally, scholars
have studied gender ideologies through the division of housework among couples. In other
words, the division of gender roles, and ultimately the gender ideologies adults hold vary based
on their relationship status because their division of housework varies based on relationship
status.
There are differences between the types of gender ideologies adults hold if they live in
traditional marriages or if they reside in more egalitarian cohabiting relationships. Much of past
research has found that married individuals are more likely to be traditional in all aspects of life
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(Morgan and Walker 1983; Mason and Lu 1988; Wilkie 1993). Some research has found that this
traditionalism has lessened over time, but an effect remains (Harris and Firestone 1998). A
possible reason that many individuals in married relationships hold more traditional gender
ideologies is because of the traditional divisions of labor between partners.
While a single person must accomplish household tasks regardless of their gendered
position in society, married individuals divide household tasks in a much more traditional
gendered way (Vespa 2009). One example of this is that women in married households may be
more likely to perform housework while men are more likely to work outside the home (Wilkie
1993). As a result, if adults in these marriages split up labor in traditional ways, men are much
more likely to hold traditional ideologies than single men are (Wilkie 1993). While these patterns
may show a selectivity effect, it may very well be that the act of doing gender in ways that are
more normative cements gender ideologies on an everyday basis. However, people who have
egalitarian ideologies shift towards traditional ones after being married, often seen through their
division of labor, and this goes against the possible selectivity argument (Gupta 1999). This is an
important example of how family structure can lead to changes in behavior and beliefs. Past
research has found support for this when they have found that marriage brings with it a shift in
roles; for example, women who marry often do more housework while men who marry do less
housework, a reflection of more traditional gender ideologies (Gupta 1999).
Married people may hold traditional ideologies because they have a partner with whom to
do gender with, but what types of ideologies do people who cohabit hold? Cohabiting adults also
have a partner with whom to do gender with on a daily basis, so one might expect that they will
hold more traditional ideologies and will do gender in ways that are more traditional. However,
by choosing to cohabit instead of marry they are eschewing traditional means of doing gender.
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As a result, these cohabiting couples appear to be going against traditional means of doing
gender, and therefore demonstrate more egalitarian ideologies than traditionally stable-marriedtwo-adult couples do. For example, scholars have found that cohabiting men contribute more to
housework, reducing the housework their partner would have to do and ultimately promoting
equitable living arrangements (Shelton and John 1993; Batalova and Cohen 2002; Davis,
Greenstein, and Marks 2007; Dominquez-Folgueras 2013). Other research has found that being
in a cohabiting relationship decreases the amount of hours of housework for women, but that it
matters less for men (Shelton and John 1993). Overall, scholars have found that cohabiting
women are not like married women, but are actually much more like single women in terms of
both their egalitarian ideologies and division of labor (Shelton and John 1993).
In addition to coupled adults, research also suggests that uncoupled adults hold different
gender ideologies. For instance, single women may go against traditional ways of doing gender
by eschewing settings that reinforce traditional gender ideologies. They do so by moving toward
more egalitarian gender ideologies, both by entering the workforce and gaining more education.
Scholars have found support for this claim as single women who have never been married spend
the least amount of time doing housework, suggesting a shift towards more egalitarian ideologies
(Shelton and John 1993). Looking at another type of single parents, scholars have found that
divorced women hold more egalitarian ideologies, especially about the division of labor in the
home, than married women do (Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Barber et al. 1989; Amato and Booth
1991; Moors 2003). Going deeper, scholars have found that divorce brings with it stressors such
as a restructuring of gender roles or changes in the levels of support outside the home (LucierGreer and Adler-Baeder 2016). Since divorced women experience these particular stressors, they
may be less likely to enact traditional doing gender behaviors, thereby shifting their own gender
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ideologies towards egalitarian ideologies. As a result, women who have divorced or chosen not
to marry may exhibit a willingness to break away from traditional means of doing gender, such
as getting married or raising children in a two-parent home (Ellman 2000). This suggests that
these divorced and single women may hold more egalitarian ideologies than women who are
married. Overall, single women, regardless of how they got there, tend to hold more egalitarian
ideologies compared to married or cohabiting women (Lucier-Greer and Adler-Baeder 2016).
In my research, in addition to looking at the potential differences between people who
have a partner with whom to do gender and those who do not have a partner, I also look at adults
who have both lived with a partner and been single. For these individuals, I expect that they will
be more egalitarian than married stable adults will because they did not always have a partner to
do gender with, similar to both single and divorced women. I also expect that they will be more
traditional than single adults will because they have been in coupled relationships where two
individuals split the housework and labor in traditional ways. Research on these re-coupled
adults tends to be limited, or looks more explicitly at how parents interact with children, not how
adults interact with each other (Sullivan 1997; Lucier-Greer and Adler-Baeder 2016). For
instance, some scholars found that women in remarried households actually do less housework,
which represents egalitarian forms of doing gender (Sullivan 1997). Other scholars have found
that this particular relationship structure is more complex, since these adults are more egalitarian
than if they were still single, but they also exhibit similar doing gender behaviors as married
couples (Lucier-Greer and Adler-Baeder 2016). Taken as a whole, regardless of the fact that
remarried adults are a more complex case, the idea that family structure has a powerful impact
on adult gender ideologies because they have a partner with whom to do gender is a very
powerful argument that warrants further research, especially for groups other than adults. I argue
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that these doing gender behaviors of couples are both similar to and different from the doing
gender behaviors of parents. Parents do gender differently than couples, and since these doing
gender behaviors matter for gender ideology development, children may develop their ideologies
differently depending on the family structure they live in. Before I can argue that youth are
affected by the doing gender behaviors of their parents, we must first understand how doing
gender operates differently for youth and their parents than it does for couples.
Doing gender among parents and children. Doing gender can operate similarly for
parents and children as it does for couples in a few different ways. For example, partners may
negotiate with each other on whether women will perform traditionally feminine tasks such as
housework or child care; similarly, parents negotiate with their children when deciding whether
to have girls perform indoor chores while boys perform outdoor chores (Duckett, Raffaelli, and
Richards 1989). One example is that girls are more often likely to help in housework as a whole
than boys are, and much of girls’ involvement in the home is influenced by the mother’s work
outside the home (Gill 1998). Mothers working outside the home may impact the doing gender
behaviors they perform with their children; this is similar to how divorced women often work
outside the home more, an example of a less traditional doing gender behavior, and how this may
make them more egalitarian (Shelton and John 1993). Another example is that parents may
negotiate with their children when deciding whether their girls will wash dishes while their boys
will make home repairs (McHale, Crouter, and Tucker 1999). Much of this decision comes from
the influence of the father over his children (McHale, Crouter, and Tucker 1999).
As a result, it makes sense to assume that these doing gender behaviors and the
negotiation of them—for both couples and parents and children—may be influenced by family
structure. For example, single parents may need more child labor around the house, so they may
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not have the luxury of choosing whether their children perform traditionally gendered tasks. This
is very similar to how single parents may be doing gender. Past research has shown us that single
adults do gender differently, possibly by choosing to be single or by working outside of the home
and, as a result, they hold more egalitarian ideologies (Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Barber et al.
1989; Shelton and John 1993).
At the same time, there are dynamics that differ across these kinds of relationships, so we
can see that doing gender may operate differently for parents and children than for couples. The
very doing gender behaviors that parents performed when they did not have children may shift
when there is another person in the picture, particularly a child (Katz-Wise, Priess, and Hyde
2013). In addition, individuals in coupled relationships may have different reasons for doing
gender with their partner than they do once they become parents, or they may have different
reasons for doing gender than their children. For example, women in coupled relationships may
be more willing to do gender in a traditional way in order to maintain their desirability to their
more traditional partners. On the other hand, youth are not likely to have similar reasons when
dealing with doing gender; their main reason stems from having a model within the home of
gender appropriate behaviors. This difference in reasons, as well as the shift in doing gender that
occurs when partners become parents, leads to the conclusion that doing gender operates
differently for partners than it does parents. For instance, within romantic relationships, doing
gender may be more of a push-pull relationship, in that partners give and take while they are
negotiating doing gender behaviors between each other, affecting the types of gender ideologies
they hold. On the other hand, doing gender in the home between parents and children is not a
push-pull relationship. Instead, this may be a more hierarchical relationship because children
look up to their parents as role models, not that parents pull their ideologies or behavior from
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their children. In this hierarchical relationship, parents hold more of the power, which may make
them more influential concerning their child’s modeling behavior or ideologies.
While we see that there are differences and similarities between the doing gender
behaviors of couples and the doing gender behaviors of parents and their children, much of this
area is unexplored. It is important to study youth because this is the period where they embody
these gender ideologies, and this is when the socialization process is occurring. By studying
them, I can come to understand how and why they adopt particular views. It is also important to
study youth because youth may be more susceptible to the doing gender behaviors of their
parents, especially since youth look to their parents as models for their own attitudes and
behaviors and these models for behavior vary based on the types of doing gender parents
perform. For instance, youth may be more vulnerable to their parent’s gendered behaviors since
they spend most of their time within the home and, at such a young age, are more likely to look
to their parents as models for appropriate gender behavior and attitudes, whereas older youth
may look more towards other models of behaviors (Davis and Greenstein 2009). In addition,
since more youth today are living in diverse family structures, such as living with cohabiting
parents, divorced parents, or with parents who married after the child was born, it is important to
understand the differences between these family structures (Bumpass and Lu 2000; Mather
2010). Past research has only looked at youth gender ideologies on a basic level, examining
briefly both the types of ideologies they hold and how they developed, finding that parental
beliefs play a part in the ideologies a youth may hold (Davis and Greenstein 2009; Davis and
Wills 2010; Boehnke 2011; Goldberg et al. 2012). However, there has been limited research
focusing specifically on how family structure creates an environment for the doing gender
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behaviors that parents perform with their children and how that influences the youth’s gender
ideologies (Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Russell and Ellis 1991).
Youth gender ideologies: the impact of family structure and doing gender. Since we
know that doing gender behaviors operate differently for parents and children than for couples,
and since family structure affects the doing gender behaviors of adults, it makes sense to assume
the same for adults. Research suggests that family structure the youth resides in affects their
gender ideologies (Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Russell and Ellis 1991). Gender ideologies seem to
vary from more traditional to egalitarian as family structure changes from two-parent bio to a
single. For example, if a youth resides with two biological parents who have always been
married, they are more likely to experience exposure to traditional ways of doing gender. Past
findings suggest that women with traditional beliefs are more likely to get married, have
children, and stay married to their child’s biological father, which are all actions reflective of
traditional ideologies (Kaufman 2000). Since these biological two-parent married families are
more likely to be traditional (Morgan and Walker 1983; Mason and Lu 1988; Kaufman 2000),
youth may be more likely to hold similar traditional ideologies because two parents of opposite
sexes expose them to traditional ways of doing gender in the home. These traditional parents
may be more likely to enact traditional means of doing gender with each other, but they are also
more likely to enact traditional means of doing gender with their children, thereby affecting their
child’s ideology.
Whereas for children raised by single parents we would expect to see the opposite, that
they would be more likely to hold egalitarian ideologies. For example, if a youth resides in a
single-parent family, they may hold the least traditional gender ideologies. This may be because
children experience less exposure to traditional types of doing gender because the parent with
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whom they live has no partner with whom to enact traditional gendered roles and behaviors. In
addition to experiencing exposure to less traditional ways of doing gender, these youths may
have less reinforcement because they spend less time with their single parent because of their
single parent working. These youths may have less reinforcement because they have seen their
single parent restructure his or her life because of a divorce or separation. Past research has
found that youth with single mothers held egalitarian ideologies (Russell and Ellis 1991), since
less traditional women head them and expose them to this dual-role of doing gender (Kiecolt and
Acock 1988; Russell and Ellis 1991).
In addition to studying stable two-parent biological married families and single-parent
families, having stepparents or social parents may expose youth to alternative ways of doing
gender. While these youth have parents of both sexes who perform traditional means of doing
gender with their children, residing in stepfamilies may result in egalitarian ideologies since
stepparents may be less physically or emotionally available to stepchildren and less willing to
parent a child that is not theirs (Lampard and Peggs 1999; Carlson and Knoester 2011). This can
lead to weaker reinforcement of traditional ideologies since children are not modeling after their
stepparent with whom they may have no relationship. As such, youth in these families
experience more exposure to less traditional examples of doing gender than they would if they
lived with both of their biological parents. However, some past research finds that having
stepparents results in more traditional child gender ideologies than having a single parent, but
results in more egalitarian ideologies than if the youth lived in a stable biological married family
(Janning, Collins and Kamm 2011; Carlson and Knoester 2011; Halpern and Jenkins 2016).
Others have found that there is no difference in gender ideologies when children have either a
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biological father or a stepfather, since these children have a same-sex model in the home (Kiecolt
and Acock 1988).
Youth residing with cohabiting parents may hold more egalitarian gender ideologies than
those in stable two-biological married parent families, and may hold gender views closer to
youth residing with stepparents. These youths may have more egalitarian gender ideologies
because their primary role models for doing gender, their cohabiting parents, have made choices
in their life to reject traditional family formation norms. Cohabiting individuals are more likely
to share housework equally (Lye and Waldron 1997; Davis, Greenstein, and Marks 2007), and
since this is a reflection of more egalitarian ways of doing gender in the home. Children exposed
to that lifestyle may be more likely to model their attitudes similarly. I do not measure
housework, but instead I examine family structure as a representation of these doing gender
behaviors, which then affect their children’s gender ideologies.
Some past research has found support for my current research project, in that they have
found that family structure does matter for the development of youth gender ideologies. When
looking at single parents for example, past scholars have found that youth with single parents are
more likely to hold egalitarian ideologies (Russell and Ellis 1991). I argue that most of this
research may not reflect current trends in gender ideologies and family structure, hence why
current research is necessary. Past research has also tended to lump together parents who have
been single since the birth of their child with parents who become single after the birth of their
child (Kiecolt and Acock 1988); this conflation may miss important nuances regarding the
impact of stability on doing gender behaviors. In addition, some research has claimed that family
structure and social background do not matter for youth gender ideology especially as they age,
but these were smaller sample sizes and may also not be reflective of current gender ideology
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trends (Davis 2007). Past research has primarily focused on single parents, two-parent families,
or stepfamilies, did not look at all family structures in one model, only included small-scale
studies that do not lend power to their argument, or found mixed results on whether or not family
structure matters (Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Davis 2007; Janning, Collins and Kamm 2011).
Overall, few recent studies have looked at how family structure affects doing gender behaviors,
or parents influences and how they do gender with their children, ultimately affecting their
child’s gender ideologies. Since there are few studies that look at this specifically, what is
especially about my research is that because I have access to better data it allows me to examine
family structures beyond the dichotomy of married, single, or recoupled. It allows me to get at
the nuances that exist within past research’s broad categories.
Youth gender ideology: what about gender? Another formative component of youth
gender ideology that may be affected by family structure and the doing gender behaviors of
parents is gender itself. Girls experience the world differently than boys do, and have different
outcomes. For example, when looking at popularity, scholars have found that girls tend to gain
popularity because of feminine and ascribed characteristics such as their looks, while boys
tended to gain popularity because of their athleticism, toughness, or success (Adler, Kless and
Adler 1992). In addition, women are less likely to be in leadership positions, partly because men
wanted more power in their lives (Schuh et al. 2014). Another example is that in recent years,
females have become more likely to finish college (Buchmann and DiPrete 2006); this may be a
reflection of their gender ideologies.
In addition to experiencing socialization through societal influences, family, especially
parents, also influences boy and girls and, consequently, their ideologies. Fathers and mothers
may parent their children differently based on sex (Raley and Bianchi 2006; Davis and
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Greenstein 2009). For instance, research shows that parents teach their boys to take more risks
while they teach girls to take fewer risks (Morrongiello and Dawber 1999). In addition, past
research has shown that same-sex role models are incredibly important (Bozett 1985). Since boys
and girls have different outcomes in life, and are treated differently based on their gender, it is
important to look at how gender influences gender ideology—since gender ideology can
influence their outcomes, and is affected by family structure and doing gender. I argue females
will be more susceptible to the effects of doing gender and family structure. This may tie back to
the power division between parents and children; perhaps parents have more power over their
daughters, which would then give them more influence over their daughter’s gender ideologies.
It may tie back to how parents do gender differently with their children than with their partners.
Furthermore, I believe that females will be more likely to hold egalitarian ideologies because
females may invest more in the outcomes of gender norms, such as workforce participation,
household division of labor, and educational opportunities. By providing a setting for doing
gender, family structure affects youth gender ideology; these ideologies may in turn affect the
opportunities youth encounter. This may be especially true for girls who wish to enter higher
education or find higher paying jobs, as traditional ideologies can become barriers to doing so
and as they may experience exposure to different doing gender behaviors from their parents.
Overall, we can see that family structure does influence doing gender behaviors of
couples, which affects the gender ideologies they hold (Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Vespa 2009).
They find that single adults tend to be egalitarian and married adults tend to be traditional
(Amato and Booth 1991; Wilkie 1993). In addition, some research has also shown that family
structure matters for youth gender ideologies, though this research is limited (Russell and Ellis
1991; Kaufman 2000). What they have found reflects what researchers have found for adults. We
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also see that females may have different gender ideologies than males will because of their
family structure and their parents’ doing gender behaviors (Bozett 1985). However, this past
research does not really look at how family structure may operate in different ways for couples
than it does for parents, especially concerning doing gender behaviors in the home. I argue that it
makes sense to assume that family structure operates through doing gender behaviors in slightly
different ways with parents and children than it does with couples. To examine the potential
relationship between family structure and youth gender ideology through the lens of doing
gender, I look at married two-parent families, single-parent families, stepparent families, and
two-parent cohabiting families.
HYPOTHESES
Since I believe that opportunities to do gender vary based on family structure, and since
youth are more vulnerable to these effects as they develop, I lay out the following hypotheses:
1 – Youth living in single-parent families will have more egalitarian gender ideologies
than youth in stable two-parent married families. Youth exposed to only one parent have less
exposure to traditional ways of doing gender than if they experienced exposure to both sexes.
2 – Youth living in stepfamilies will have more egalitarian ideologies than stable twoparent married families. Youth exposed to two married parents will have traditional gender roles
reinforced more frequently and intensely, but because stepparents may be reluctant to parent a
child who is not biologically theirs (Lampard and Peggs 1999), they may present a weaker
version of traditionally gendered family roles than would two married biological parents. In
addition, exposure to a single-parent lifestyle, where their ideologies may become more
egalitarian, may create effects that last into the remarriage or re-partnership of their parents.
3 – Youth living in cohabiting families (social parents) will have more egalitarian gender
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ideologies than youth in stable two-parent married families. While cohabiters have access to
another person to do gender with, they have made an affirmative choice to reject traditional
family formation norms, many of which come with gendered role expectations already attached.
4 – Girls will be more sensitive to these family structure and doing gender effects than
boys will, and will therefore be more egalitarian than boys will. Family structure may affect girls
more strongly than boys since societal pressures revolving around gender norms may personally
affect females, and since they may be more susceptible to parental doing gender behaviors.
DATA & METHODS
For this project, I use the German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS), a nationally
representative study, which surveyed and interviewed students at German schools using a
longitudinal design. The NEPS dataset has two youth cohorts: one starting in fifth grade and
ending in eighth grade and another starting in ninth grade and ending in twelfth grade. The
survey focused mainly on educational pathways and outcomes, but information on gender
ideologies is also available. Students and their parents participated in the survey through their
school systems. I use the NEPS dataset because not only do they capture ages that are vulnerable
to the effects of family structure on gender ideology development, but they also include
interesting measures of gender ideology. My current research project studies gender ideology by
looking at perceptions of division of labor, technical skills, and career types. I also use NEPS
data because Germany is an interesting case to study in that Germans tend to have more
egalitarian ideologies than Eastern countries or the United States, and these more egalitarian
ideologies have led to more national-level childcare and welfare opportunities (Dirksmeier
2015). In addition, gender ideology research tends to focus mainly on the United States, so
Germany is an interesting case to study.
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From the first cohort, I use the second wave (average age 11); from the second cohort, I
use the third wave (average age 15). I use both cohorts because I wanted to see if the
socialization process occurs differently as the youth age. After excluding cases that were missing
information on gender ideology outcomes and family structure, the total sample size for the first
cohort is 4,181, and the total sample size for the second cohort is 9,913. I analyze each cohort
separately and compare the effect sizes across the two age groups as a partial test of how gender
ideologies develop as children age.
Gender Ideology Measures
Gender ideology can refer to “the underlying concept of an individual’s level of support
for a division of paid work and family responsibilities that is based on the notion of separate
spheres” (Davis and Greenstein 2009:89). The cohorts I use touch on beliefs about gender in
education or the workplace, femininity, and household labor divisions, which is similar to
previous work (Davis and Greenstein 2009). Within the NEPS, I measure gender ideology
through a set of questions that ask respondents to record their responses on a scale of 1 “disagree
completely” to 4 “agree completely.” NEPS gender ideology statements for 6th and 10th graders
include statements such as “boys and girls should have the same chores at home,” “girls can
handle technical devices just as well as boys,” “girls should be able to learn the same professions
as boys,” and “for some professions, men are better suited than women.” I reverse recoded the
last statements so that higher values reflect more egalitarian gender ideologies. I then constructed
a gender ideology scale by using the row means of the gender ideology statements and dividing
by the total number of statements, resulting in a final scale of 1 to 4: “completely disagree” to
“completely agree” where higher values represent more egalitarian gender ideologies. Finally, I
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dropped any cases that were missing information on more than two of the questions. See Table 1
for a full description of all gender ideology measures, as well as other variables used in analysis.
[Table 1 about here]
Family Structure Measures
To capture family structure, I created my own categories from available NEPS data. To
do so for each cohort, I use the available parent data (including marital status, whether the parent
lives with a partner, relationship to the youth, and the year they began living with a partner); if
parent data were missing, then I used information on youth (including household composition
and role of parents) to fill family structure. If both information on the parent, the parent-child
relationship, or household composition data were missing, but the main parent was living with
the same partner as before, I filled in missing data using family structure data from the previous
waves. After completing that process, if family structure was still unknown, I dropped the case.
Cohort two family structure questions varied slightly from cohort one family structure questions.
Within cohort two, family structure questions, such as parental marital status, parent-child
relationship, household composition, and role of parents, are present in some waves. As a result,
I used all of the questions available in waves one through three to create these family structures.
The final family structure categories I created using the NEPS include “biological married
stable,” “biological cohabiting stable,” “biological single stable,” “post-birth single,” “post-birth
stepfamily,” “post-birth social family,” and “post-birth biological cohabit/married family.”
Three categories capture stability within family structures. “Biological Married Stable”
applies to youth who have lived, and continue to live, with two married biological parents.
“Biological Cohabit Stable” captures whether the youth currently lives with two cohabiting
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biological parents, and has lived with them since birth. “Biological Single Stable” applies to
youth who have lived, and continue to live with one single biological parent.
Four categories capture instability within family structures. “Post-Birth Single” captures
whether the youth currently lives with a single parent who became single after the youth was
born, through divorce, separation, or death. “Post-Birth Stepfamily” applies to youth who
currently live with one biological and a stepparent. For example, a youth living with a biological
father who remarried someone other than the biological mother fits this category. “Post-Birth
Social Family” applies to youth who live with one biological parent and one social parent who
started cohabiting after the youth was born. This is similar in nature to the “post-birth
stepfamily” with the sole difference being that the parents in the previous category are married.
My final family structure variable, “post-birth biological married/cohabit,” includes children who
reside with their biological parents but whose parents began living together after they were born.
Table 2 presents the percentages of youth within these family structures.
Youth Gender
I also include youth gender as part of my interaction effect because I believe females are
more likely to hold egalitarian gender ideologies since societal laws revolving around gender
norms in the home and workplace may affect females more personally. In addition, I include
gender because past research has shown that parents parent their sons and daughters differently
(Morrongiello and Dawber 1999), and I believe this affects the development of gender
ideologies. I recoded child gender so that 0 equaled “female” and 1 equaled “male.”
Control Measures
In addition to including gender as a separate control, I also include parental education,
parental employment status, household income, child age, youth religious affiliation, and youth
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religiosity as general controls. Since parents provide a role model for youth, I control for
parental education. For example, adults with more education tend to have more egalitarian
gender ideologies (Alwin 1989; see also Davis and Greenstein 2009). As a result, parental
education may influence child gender ideologies, so I control for it and other factors in my final
models. I constructed maternal education to reflect major credentials: “lower general education –
less than high school,” “high school equivalent,” “some college (or other similar qualifications),”
“bachelor’s degree,” and “doctoral degree or similar.” In addition to education, occupation and
income are two indicators of socioeconomic status that can influence parental gender ideologies
(Alwin 1989).
I use maternal employment instead of both partner and main parent employment because
I focus mainly on attitudes about female equality and opportunities. Maternal employment was
recoded to indicate levels of participation in the paid work force: “full time," “part time,"
“unemployed but looking for work,” “student/in training,” “homemaker," and “no mother in
home.” Income in the NEPS is a continuous variable that I logged due to skewness. This resulted
in a range from about 7 to about 14. In addition, I also include religious denomination since
some religions may subscribe to more traditional gender ideologies than others. I also included a
measure of religiosity because individuals who actively participate in religious activities may
hold more traditional gender ideologies. Religious denomination categories include “Roman
Catholic,” “Protestant,” and “other,” while religiosity categories range from “not at all religious”
to “very religious.” I originally included youth nationality because I believed that individuals
who are immigrants into Germany might have different gender ideologies, but due to small cell
size, I was unable to use this measure. I attempted to get at nationality through language spoken
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at home, but it left me with the same problem as mentioned above. I do acknowledge there are
limitations associated with not including nationality measures in my models.
Missing Values
As with all research, missing values can affect the accuracy of estimates. I fill in missing
values for family structure using available parent data, such as marital status and relationship to
youth; if parent data was missing, then I filled in missing using youth data, such as household
rosters and role of parent data. If both youth and parent data was missing, these family structure
cases were dropped. For missing values on the gender ideology measure, I dropped if they were
missing two or more items from the scale. For control variables that had missing information, I
performed single imputations where I used other variables to predict missing values on controls
such as education or occupation. I compared means of control variables before and after
imputations and found similar distributions before and after.
Analysis Plan
I perform separate analysis for each of the two cohorts. I first present the percentage of
youth in various family structures; I also present descriptive statistics on the gender ideology
scale, as well as other variables, across family structures (Table 2). This allows me to examine
whether there are differences in average gender ideologies scores across family structures. I then
conduct multivariate analyses (Table 3) using ordinal logistic regression, presented in odds
ratios. To calculate the percentage of the likelihood of holding more egalitarian gender
ideologies, I subtract the odds ratio coefficient from one and then multiply by 100 ((1-odds ratio
coefficient) *100). As a result, odds ratios higher than one have a positive effect while odds
ratios lower than one have a negative effect. First, I present a model with only family structure
and gender ideology (Model 1). I then present a model with only youth gender and gender
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ideology (Model 2). The third model includes family structure, youth gender, gender ideology,
and all controls (Model 3). I also run another model with an interaction term between youth
gender and family structure (Model 4). I do this in order to see whether girls are more sensitive
to the effects of family structure on the development of their gender ideologies than boys are.
RESULTS
My first analysis looks at the number and percentage of youth in various family structures
(Table 2).
[Table 2 about here]
My findings suggest that the majority of youth in this sample (about 70 percent) reside in a stable
two-parent biological married family, regardless of cohort. The next largest percentage (about 13
percent) captures youth who reside in post-birth single families–in families where the child’s
main parent was divorced, separated, or widowed after the child’s birth. When looking at other
research, results suggest that Germany has a different distribution of youth across family
structures than other countries (Dufur et al. 2016). This could mean that any potential differences
we see in the effects of family structure on gender ideology may occur because of cultural
differences in Germany. It also reiterates the point that Germany is an interesting case to study
since youth are living in different families than youth in other countries are. Older youth are
more likely to reside in post-birth stepfamilies, biological cohabit stable families, post-birth
single families, or post-birth biological families than younger individuals are (Table 2).
My second analysis looks at the means of gender ideologies across family structures for
both cohort one and two (Table 2). I found that the majority of youth, regardless of their family
structure, have middle-range gender ideologies in both cohort one and cohort two (Table 2).
There is little variation across the family structures, calling into question my assertion that family
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structure would help shape youths’ gender ideologies. However, I do see that younger kids (the
first cohort) have less egalitarian ideologies in biological cohabiting families, stepfamilies, and
post-birth biological married/cohabit families (Table 2). On the other hand, older youth in postbirth stepfamilies and biological cohabiting families are more egalitarian (Table 2). Regardless
of cohort, youth residing in single families tend to be the most egalitarian, and that those in postbirth social families are less egalitarian compared to those residing in stable biological married
families (Table 2). This suggests that perhaps there are cultural factors in Germany that shape
both family formation practices and gender ideologies that differ substantially from otherwise
similar countries, making Germany an even more intriguing setting for future study. Older kids,
cohort two, are more likely to hold egalitarian gender ideologies regardless of family structure,
except for post-birth social families where the gender ideology mean is similar across both
cohorts (Table 2).
I then examine the number and percentage of females, slightly religious youth, as well as
the number of youth with mothers working full time, mothers with bachelor’s degrees (Table 2).
The majority of youth across both cohorts in biological two-parent married stable or in post-birth
single parent families are female (about 50 percent). Females may be more susceptible to the
doing gender behaviors of their parents, so if more children in these traditional family structures
are female, they may be more likely to hold similar traditional gender ideologies. In addition,
mothers in single parent families are much less likely to hold bachelor’s degrees. In post-birth
social families, single stable families, and cohabiting stable families, youth are more likely to
have mothers who are working full-time than in other family structures (Table 2). I do find that
the older cohort has a higher percentage of mothers working, suggesting that there may have
been a shift in gender ideologies towards more egalitarian views as the youth age, or that women
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with older children are more likely to work (Table 2). From my sample, it seems that a majority
of youth in Germany tend be slightly religious, but that youth in biological two-parent stable
married families are more likely to be “slightly religious” than youth in other family structures.
This may affect the socialization process in the home. However, the older cohort is slightly less
likely to be “slightly religious” than the younger cohort is (Table 2).
My multivariate analysis (Table 3) provides little support for my hypotheses. Before
including controls, within cohort one, children residing in a post-birth biological cohabit/married
family are less likely to have egalitarian gender ideologies, and children in post-birth
stepfamilies are more likely to hold egalitarian gender ideologies (Model 1). Not only did I find
no support for hypothesis four from these results, but I also found the opposite. Children residing
in post-birth biological cohabit or married families are actually less egalitarian than those in
stable biological married families are. I do find initial support for hypothesis two for cohort one
when I find that youth in stepfamilies are more egalitarian than youth in stable biological married
families. On the other hand, in cohort two, before including controls, no family structure was
significant (Model 1). This suggests that there is a change in the socialization process within
families as youth get older, or that younger youth are more affected by family structure and their
parents’ doing gender behaviors than older youth are.
[Table 3 about here]
After including controls, I find that living in a post-birth biological cohabit/married
family significantly results in a youth being less egalitarian, and living in a post-birth stepfamily
results in the opposite for cohort one (Model 3). Once again, I find no support for hypothesis
four, but do find support for hypothesis two. For cohort two, living in a biological cohabit stable
family results in youth being more traditional (Model 3). I do caution the reader because this is a
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small group. This result initially rejects hypothesis 3, though I believe there are limitations
associated with this result that I will discuss later; I originally claimed that living in a cohabiting
family would make youth more egalitarian, but it actually does the opposite. For cohort one,
having a mother who works part time results in a youth being more traditional compared to youth
living with a mother who works full-time. This result makes sense when considering that women
who work full-time are more likely to hold more egalitarian gender ideologies that they model
for their children. Surprisingly, greater maternal education was not associated with more
egalitarian gender attitudes among youth for either cohort. In addition, having an older mother
increases support for egalitarian gender ideologies, while being slightly non-religious, slightly
religious, and very religious decreases support for egalitarian gender ideologies as compared to
being not religious. Both of these results are significant only in cohort two (Model 3). This
suggests that family structure matters less for older youth, and that other parental and youth
characteristics matter more. Overall, my first multivariate analyses suggest support for
hypotheses two and three, and rejects hypothesis one and four. Hypothesis two claimed that
residing in a stepfamily would result in youth holding egalitarian gender ideologies than if they
lived in a stable two-parent biological married family. Hypothesis three claimed that youth living
in cohabiting families would be more egalitarian than if they had been in stable two-parent
biological married families, but I found the opposite was true for the older cohort. This category
is smaller than the other categories, so if future research was to look at this category with a larger
sample size, the results may support the original hypothesis.
The most notable effect comes into play with youth gender. Females, even before
including family structure or other controls, are more likely to hold egalitarian gender ideologies
than males (Model 2). After including family structure and controls, for cohort one, females are
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five and a half times more likely to hold egalitarian gender ideologies than males; in cohort two,
females are eight and a half times more likely to hold egalitarian gender ideologies than males
(Model 3). This gender effect remains strong after controlling for maternal employment and
education, as well as family income, religiosity, and religion, suggesting that gender itself is a
large motivating factor in whether an individual will hold egalitarian gender ideologies. This
shows partial support for my final hypothesis that females are more egalitarian.
Another part of my final hypothesis was that females would be more susceptible to the
effects of family structure and doing gender. We assume that since gender mattered for previous
models, that it would matter with combined with family structure. In other words, I assumed that
parents would parent their sons and daughters differently, since past literature has shown similar
results (Raley and Bianchi 2006; Davis and Greenstein 2009), and that this would then affect
their youth’s gender ideology. After running models with the interaction between youth gender
and family structure and performing various statistical checks, I found that the cell sizes of the
interactions prevented me from finding support for my original claim. Therefore, I do not present
those results.
DISCUSSION
Looking back at the past research, we see that there are a few main arguments that are
important to reiterate before delving into what this all means. One is that gender ideologies
matter for a variety of outcomes, both at the societal and individual level (Christie-Mizell et al.
2007; Brandt 2011), and this is why gender ideologies are so important to study. Second is that
the family structure adults currently reside in affects the doing gender behaviors they perform
with their partner, which then affects their gender ideology. Past scholars have found support for
this claim when they found that single adults are more egalitarian while married adults are less
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egalitarian (Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Amato and Booth 1991; Wilkie 1993; Vespa 2009). The
third argument is that this argument from adults can also apply to youth, but in slightly different
ways. I argued that the family structure a youth lived in affected the doing gender behaviors that
their parents perform with them, which then impacts the youth’s gender ideology development
through both reinforcement and exposure to traditional or egalitarian ideologies. Some scholars
have found results to support parts of this claim, but the majority have focused on very limited
family structures or does not delve deeper into the doing gender argument (Russell and Ellis
1991; Kaufman 2000). The final argument I made, which scholars found support for, is family
structure affects youth gender in different ways, which then affects the development of youth
gender ideologies. Scholars have found that parents raise females differently than males, and that
this can affect their gender ideology development (Bozett 1985). Overall, I originally argued that
family structure would matter for the development of youth gender ideologies because of the
doing gender behaviors that parents perform with their children. My results show support for
some of these arguments, but does not show support for my main argument – that family
structure matters.
My second and third argument revolve around the idea that family structure affects
gender ideology through doing gender behaviors. When looking at adults, previous research has
found that parental coupling affects doing gender, which in turn affects gender ideology (Wilkie
1993; Lucier-Greer & Adler-Baeder 2016). For instance, some past research found that married
adults are more traditional than single, divorced or cohabiting adults are which is evident when
looking at their division of housework (Morgan and Walker 1983; Wilkie 1993). Furthermore,
past research has also found that some family structures exert an egalitarian influence on youth
gender ideologies through the doing gender behaviors, mainly division of housework (Shelton
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and John 1993; Vespa 2009; Lucier-Greer and Adler-Baeder 2016). Doing gender operates
through family structure for couples like mentioned above, so one would assume that it does
operate through family structure for parents and children, even if it was in slightly different
ways. I did find that youth living with stepparents are more egalitarian, which supports one of
my original hypotheses. This result may occur because children are more likely to have exposure
to less traditional doing gender behaviors with stepparents, or because they do not have a
relationship with the stepparent which allows for the doing gender behaviors to translate to
gender ideology development (Carlson and Knoester 2011). However, my results overall suggest
that other than for younger adults living in stepfamilies, family structure really plays no part in
affecting the doing gender behaviors parents perform with their children, or that it does so in
other ways, and, therefore, family structure does not affect the development of gender ideologies
among youth in Germany. This is interesting because it goes against what I thought would
happen based on past research (Russell and Ellis 1991; Kaufman 2000). My null findings shows
us that because society is constantly changing, that socialization can occur through different
pathways, and that perhaps family structure operates in different ways than how past scholars
have imagined.
What my null findings do suggest is that what couples do in their home with their
children to do gender does not affect youth gender ideologies. These shifts in partnering that
adults experience may force them to confront how they do gender, but this does not pass down to
their children. Even using the most comprehensive family structure models, family structure still
explains very little of the differences in gender ideologies for youth in Germany, which goes
against past research (Russell and Ellis 1991; Kaufman 2000). This allows us to rule out family
structure, and to look elsewhere for why gender ideologies vary across youth. Perhaps this null
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finding has to do with how we are describing the relationship of doing gender between parents
and children– maybe this relationship is not hierarchical, but actually much more push and pull
like for adult couples. Perhaps the relationship between parents, doing gender, children, and
youth gender ideology is similar to the relationship of couples – a push-pull relationship between
individuals instead of a hierarchical one. This gap is one area where future research could shed
more light on.
Furthermore, it makes sense to claim that what actually matters for the development of
youth gender ideologies may be how adults do gender in other ways, specific personal
characteristics of the youth or parent, or even societal influences I cannot capture. In addition, a
youth’s characteristics, such as their gender or religion, matters more than family structure for
the development of gender ideologies. For instance, I found that having a mother who works part
or full time increases the odds that the youth will hold egalitarian gender ideologies. Past
research echoes this result, because women working has often been associated with egalitarian
ideologies (Brewster and Padavic 2000). It makes sense to assume that this effect may transfer to
the child through modeling that occurs in ways other than doing gender negotiation between
parents and children. In addition to having a working mother, my results suggest that having an
older mother also increases the odds that the youth will hold egalitarian ideologies. One
theoretical explanation for this is that women who put off having children may be choosing to
eschew more traditional doing gender behaviors since what much of society expects of women is
to have children or to have them earlier. These results are prime examples of showing that the
ways adults do gender outside the home, such as having children later or working outside the
home, matter more than the ways they do gender in the home or with a partner. These doing
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gender behaviors outside of the home or relationship may still provide models for children in
ways I did not capture.
In terms of finding that youth characteristics matter for the development of gender
ideologies, I find that individual youth characteristics such as religion and religiosity influence
gender ideology development of youth in Germany. For instance, compared to those who are
very not religious, those who are more religious are more likely to hold traditional gender
ideologies. Past scholars agree that those who are less religious are more likely to be supportive
of LGBTQ relationships, one marker of an egalitarian ideology (Harbaugh and Lindsey 2015). In
addition, I also found that older kids, who are a part of an “other” religion, which includes more
conservative religions like Muslim or Jewish, are more traditional than those who are Roman
Catholic. The fact that this finding is only present for the older cohort suggests religiosity and
religious identity matter more as youth get older. Furthermore, the finding that religion and
religiousness matter suggests that the experiences youths have in their own lives may be more
important for developing their ideologies than the family structure they lived in growing up. It
also suggests that perhaps religion is more of a socializing agent than family, at least in this
context. Past research echoes this, finding personal experiences of daughters matter more than
their mother’s ideologies (Moens, Erickson, and Dempster-McClain 1997). This may show
support for the first part of my argument, in that family structure of adults does matter for their
gender ideologies, since the family structure they currently reside in may reflect personal
experiences that have affected their gender ideology, as opposed to the family structure they
lived in growing up.
Concerning my final argument, I found support for it when I found females are more
egalitarian. As I discussed earlier, one theoretical explanation for this result may be that females
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invest more in the outcomes of gender norms, such as workforce participation, household
division of labor, and even educational opportunities (John, Shelton, and Luschen 1995;
Kaufman and Bernhardt 2012). Past research has shown that more egalitarian gender ideologies
result in higher educational attainment, higher self-esteem, more involvement in the workforce,
in government, and in education, especially for women (Davis and Pearce 2007; Weiss et al.
2012). For instance, females may be more likely to benefit from higher educational attainment or
more involvement in society. Since females may be more invested in these outcomes, may
benefit more from them, and are more likely to hold egalitarian gender ideologies, researchers
should be aware of the bigger impact gender has on gender ideologies. I will mention more
specific policy implications later on. Policy makers should be aware that gender plays a huge
part in the acceptance of particular gender ideologies, which can influence the opportunities
individuals have in society. If females are more likely to hold egalitarian gender ideologies,
politicians and lawmakers should be conscious of this when creating laws that involve gender.
This gender component transcends cultural barriers as well, given that our results are for
youth in Germany, but we may see similar trends in the United States. Perhaps these findings are
occurring in Germany because of factors I cannot measure. German culture may be more
accepting of women as a whole, or that women in Germany may have more opportunities open
to them, so they become more egalitarian. Perhaps socialization in German families is different
from American families. This is one area future research can explore further.
Another part of my original argument dealing with youth gender revolved around family
structure and gender. Since I found that being female influences the ideologies one holds, I also
thought that youth gender would specifically play a part in how parents do gender. Past research
has shown that fathers and mothers parent their children differently depending on sex (Raley and
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Bianchi 2006; Davis and Greenstein 2009). For example, as I discussed earlier, parents teach
their boys to act differently than they teach their daughters to (Morrongiello and Dawber 1999). I
had expected that females living in less traditional families would be more egalitarian, or that
males living in stable married families would be more traditional. After running these
interactions between youth gender and family structure, I find that youth gender on its own plays
a part in the ideologies a youth holds, but that family structure does not interact with gender to
influence gender ideology. In other words, I found no support for the idea that parents raise their
children differently based on sex, or that living in particular family structures has more impact on
females than males. This result may be because my cell size may have caused problems with the
analysis, so this does not suggest that future researchers should not study gender and family
interactions, only that they need better data so that they can still capture the detail of various
family structures, while still being able to run analyses.
I acknowledge that there are limitations to my research; for instance, missing control
variables, such as nationality/race, may also play a part in the development of gender ideology
for youth. If future researchers were able to create surveys that captured both measures of gender
ideology as well as control variables connected to ideology development, such as nationality,
then perhaps scholars could get a more complete picture of how gender ideology develops. In
addition, while my results suggest that family structure does not play a part in the development
of gender ideology, I acknowledge there are other aspects of family structure I cannot capture
with my dataset. For instance, shifts in family structure or the time spent in various family
structures may influence gender ideology development more than the actual family structure. I
was also not able to include cross-sex analysis between parents and children, and I was not able
to know much about non-custodial or joint custody arrangements. These may have impacts on
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the doing gender behaviors that children are exposed to. Future research may be able to help
resolve my research’s limitations. In the future, I would like to study these extra areas relating to
family structure, but my current data are not set up for studying other aspects of family structure.
In addition, my research does not look at the intergenerational transmission of gender ideology,
mainly because I do not have data on how the parents themselves grew up. As a result, I suggest
that future research looks at whether adults are more susceptible to gender ideology shifts as
their relationships and family partnering change.
Overall, when looking back at the outline of my arguments (that family structure affects
adult gender ideologies through gender behavior, that family structure does the same for youth in
slightly different ways, and that youth gender matters for gender ideology development), I find
limited support. Family structure does not appear to affect gender ideology through doing
gender. However, due to important limitations, future research on the impact of family structure
on gender ideology, should examine how societal trends influence families and ideologies over
time. The fact that previous research has found effects of adult romantic coupling on gender
ideologies, but has claimed family structure effects, is an important distinction that much of the
research has not made clear. In addition, my null findings suggest family structure does not
matter for gender ideology development, but it is possibly some other way of doing gender that
matters. What I mean by this is that the doing gender behaviors that parents perform with their
children, such as how they split the division of labor or even other sex-typed modeling, may not
matter as much as the doing gender behaviors they do outside of the home, such as having a
more educated mother or having a working mother.
My findings have important consequences for policy makers as well. For instance, policy
makers should be aware of religious differences in the implementations of gender policies,
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possibly making more religion-specific gender policies in the workplace. In addition, we know
that parental characteristics really matter for the development of gender ideologies among youth.
I believe that policies can be implemented (or improved) that can influence parents, which can
then affect their children. For instance, if society implements policies so that more women
entered the workforce, then perhaps when women become mothers, their egalitarian ideologies
will trickle down to their children because they provide a model of egalitarian doing gender
outside the home. In addition, they could implement laws that allow women to return to the
workforce after having children, or policies that allow women with younger children to work,
such as having childcare facilities available. In addition, one of my other findings was that older
mothers are more likely to have egalitarian youth. One possible implication from this revolves
around birth control and pregnancy policies. I am not advocating that all women have children
later, but that gender oriented policies should make this option available to women. In less
developed societies, many women have children earlier in their life course, which may prevent
them from gaining an education or from working (Kristoff and WuDunn 2010). If other countries
could implement similar policies that allow women to gain an education, or work while they are
mothers, this modeling can then affect their children. This intergenerational transmission could
possibly resulting in a more egalitarian society as a whole. These are just a few examples of
policy implications that can come from my research findings, but this only goes to show that
society need to make more strides in making things equal for all.
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TABLES
Table 1. Description of Variables in NEPS (Germany) Data
Range

Cohort One
Mean

Cohort Two
Mean

1=Completely Disagree
2=Disagree
3=Agree
4=Completely Agree

CD=0.13
D=0.37
A=0.44
CA=0.07

CD=0.07
D=0.39
A=0.50
CA=0.04

Dependent Variable: Gender Ideology
Consists of a 4-item scale with response categories ranging from “completely
disagree” to “completely agree.” Statements include "Boys and girls should
have the same chores/duties at home," "girls can handle technical devices just
as well as boys," "girls should be able to learn the same professions as boys,"
"for some professions, men are better suited than women." Higher values equal
more support for egalitarian gender ideologies.
Independent Variables: Family Structure at Current Wave
Stable Biological Married Family

Two biological parents married from
birth to current wave

0-1

0.72

0.71

Stable Biological Cohabiting Family

Two biological parents cohabiting
from birth to current wave

0-1

0.01

0.02

Stable Biological Single Family

Biological parent single from birth to
current wave

0-1

0.02

0.01

Biological parent who “divorced,"
“widowed,” or “separated,” and is not
living with a partner at current wave

0-1

0.12

0.13

Biological parent said they “married”
the non-biological partner after the
birth of the youth.

0-1

0.07

0.08

Biological parent said they began
“living with a non-biological partner
(who was not a stepparent)” after the
birth of the youth.

0-1

0.03

0.01

Biological parent said they began
“living with the biological parent”
after the birth of the youth, but I was
unable to determine marital status.

0-1

0.03

0.04

Post-Birth Single Family
Post-Birth Stepfamily

Post-Birth Social Family

Post-Birth Biological Family (married or
cohabit)

45

Table 1 cont. Description of Variables in NEPS (Germany) Data

Youth Gender

Range

Cohort One
Mean

Cohort Two
Mean

0=Female
1=Male

0.51

0.49

1=Less than HS
2=High School
3=Some College
4=Bachelors/Masters
5=Doctoral/Similar
6=No Mother

0.10
0.05
0.64
0.18
0.02
0.02

0.09
0.04
0.68
0.17
0.01
0.01

1=Unemployed
2=Homemaker
3=Student/In training
4=Side Job
5=Part Time
6=Full Time
7=No Mother

0.04
0.17
0.01
0.09
0.50
0.18
0.02

0.03
0.22
0.01
0.001
0.41
0.32
0.01

Cohort One: 11 to 50
Cohort Two: 14 to 47

30.41
(sd=5.14)

29.89
(sd=4.41)

1=Roman Catholic
2=Protestant
3=Other

0.36
0.45
0.19

0.44
0.46
0.10

Cohort One: 7.01 to
13.71
Cohort Two: 6.93 to
13.77

10.46
(sd=0.71)

10.46
(sd=0.69)

Controls
Mother Education
Highest education achieved by mother; High School equivalent is the reference
category.
Mother Employment

Current employment of mother, based on number of working hours and type of
job; Full time is reference category.

Mother's Age at Birth
Measured in years at time of interview
Religion

Youth religious denomination; categories include “Roman Catholic,” “Protestant,”
and “Other Religion.” Roman Catholic is the reference category.

Household Income
Reported as total monthly Euros, but multiplied by 12 to change to yearly income;
logged because of original variable skewness
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Table 1 cont. Description of Variables in NEPS (Germany) Data
Range

Cohort One
Mean

Cohort Two
Mean

1=Not at all religious
2=Slightly not religious
3=Slightly religious
4=Very Religious

0.18
0.27
0.42
0.13

0.25
0.34
0.34
0.07

Cohort One=10-13
Cohort Two=15-19

11.48
(sd=0.58)

16.64
(sd=0.66)

Youth Religiosity
Youth religiosity measures; categories include “not at all religious,” “slightly not
religious,” “slightly religious,” and “very religious.” Not at all religious is the
reference category.
Age
Measured in years at time of interview
Cohort One N=4,181 & Cohort Two N=9,913
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Table 2. Number and Percentage of Youth (and other controls variables) across Family Structures, and Means and Standard
Deviations of Gender Ideology across Family Structures (Cohort One N=4,181) (Cohort Two N=9,913)
Biological
Married Stable

Biological
Single Stable

Biological
Cohabit Stable

Post-Birth
Stepfamily

Post-Birth
Single

Post-Birth
Social Family

Post-Birth Biological
Married & Cohabit
Family

Number and Percentage of:
Youth Cohort 1
Youth Cohort 2

3003
(71.82%)

88
(2.10%)

57
(1.36%)

290
(6.94%)

516
(12.34%)

109
(2.61%)

118
(2.82%)

7010
(70.72%)

205
(2.07%)

57
(0.58%)

836
(8.43%)

1315
(13.27%)

87
(0.88%)

403
(4.07%)

Mean and Standard Deviation for:
Gender Ideology
Cohort 1

2.45
(0.80)

2.52
(0.84)

2.39
(0.86)

2.41
(0.79)

2.48
(0.77)

2.44
(0.83)

2.25
(0.81)

Gender Ideology
Cohort 2

2.50
(0.68)

2.61
(0.65)

2.51
(0.66)

2.54
(0.71)

2.52
(0.70)

2.48
(0.68)

2.54
(0.67)

Full-time Working
Mothers Cohort 1

462
(15.38%)

27
(30.68%)

21
(36.84%)

62
(21.38%)

120
(23.26%)

43
(39.45%)

29
(24.58%)

Full-time Working
Mothers Cohort 2

2136
(30.47%)

69
(33.66%)

34
(59.65%)

310
(37.08%)

436
(33.16%)

33
(37.93%)

165
(40.94%)

Mothers with
Bachelor’s Cohort 1

573
(19.08%)

12
(13.64%)

12
(21.05%)

32
(11.03%)

72
(13.95%)

22
(20.18%)

16
(13.56%)

Mothers with
Bachelor’s Cohort 2

1214
(17.32%)

27
(13.17%)

14
(24.56%)

116
(13.88%)

174
(13.23%)

15
(17.24%)

72
(17.87%)

Youth Slightly
Religious Cohort 1

1339
(44.59%)

27
(30.68%)

17
(29.82%)

106
(36.55%)

195
(37.79%)

27
(24.77%)

49
(41.53%)

Youth Slightly
Religious Cohort 2

2587
(36.90%)

38
(18.54%)

9
(15.79%)

218
(26.08%)

334
(25.40%)

16
(18.39%)

119
(29.53%)
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Table 3. Ordinal Logistic Regression (Odds Ratios) of Gender Ideology Scale by Family Structure (Model 1), Gender (Model 2), and
Controls (Model 3) (Cohort One N=4,131) (Cohort Two N=9,913) (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Cohort One
Model 1

Model 2

Cohort Two
Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Family Structure
Biological Single Stable
Biological Cohabit Stable
Post-Birth Stepfamily
Post-Birth Single
Post-Birth Social Family
Post-Birth Biological Married & Cohabit Family
Female

0.88
(0.24)
0.51
(0.30)
2.83*
(1.38)
1.07
(0.22)
0.77
(0.22)
0.34***
(0.06)
3.30**
(1.51)

Maternal Employment
Unemployed

1.11
(0.33)
0.63
(0.31)
4.39**
(2.15)
1.25
(0.21)
0.88
(0.25)
0.48*
(0.14)
5.46***
(1.16)
1.1
(0.43)
0.98
(0.30)
0.54
(0.21)
0.6
(0.20)
0.48**
(0.13)
0.43
(0.22)
1.28
(0.21)

Homemaker/Househusband
Student/In training
Side Job
Part Time
No mother in home
Yearly Income (logged)
Maternal Education
Less than High School

1.19
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1.31
(0.25)
1.03
(0.25)
1.15
(0.10)
1.02
(0.07)
0.89
(0.19)
1.14
(0.12)
8.21***
(0.42)

1.24
(0.23)
0.61*
(0.11)
1.11
(0.11)
1.05
(0.08)
0.69
(0.17)
1.2
(0.14)
8.64***
(0.46)
0.91
(0.14)
0.89
(0.06)
1.19
(0.35)
0.87
(0.79)
0.96
(0.06)
0.5
(0.31)
1.03
(0.04)
0.86

Some College
Bachelors or higher
Doctoral or similar
Mother's Age at Birth
Youth Age
Youth Religion
Protestant
Other
Youth Religiosity
Slightly non-religious
Slightly religious
Very Religious
Cut1
Cut2
Cut3

-2.28
(0.17)
-0.18
(0.13)
3.08
(0.57)
0.03
4,181

-1.91
(0.33)
0.19
(0.51)
3.47
(0.29)
0.04
4,181

(0.49)
1.01
(0.31)
0.96
(0.36)
1.26
(0.52)
1.01
(0.02)
0.97
(0.14)

(0.12)
0.97
(0.12)
1.02
(0.14)
1.54
(0.35)
1.02**
(0.01)
1.02
(0.05)

1.11
(0.11)
1.34
(0.31)

1.05
(0.05)
0.78*
(0.08)

1.32
(0.22)
1.38
(0.25)
1.37
(0.40)
0.90
(2.39)
3.29
(2.38)
6.87
(2.50)
0.12
4,181

0.78***
(0.06)
0.75***
(0.06)
0.55***
(0.06)
-1.16
(0.84)
1.71
(0.84)
5.47
(0.83)
0.13
9,913

-2.57
(0.05)
-0.13
(0.03)
3.12
(0.08)
0.00
9,913

-1.95
(0.05)
0.88
(0.04)
4.61
(0.08)
0.12
9,913

Pseudo R-Squared
N
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
Note: Males were the reference group for gender. I do not control for nationality because of dataset limitations. I also do not include “no mother in home”
under mother education because of multicollinearity issues.
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